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INTRODUCTION
In 1965, Northwestern University Law Review published Professor
Marshall Shapo’s article, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the
Frontiers Beyond.1 Professor Shapo’s paper analyzed the origins of
constitutional tort law, which consists of suits for damages for constitutional
violations committed by government officials or the governments
themselves. The article began with an account of the post-Civil War
background of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute enacted in 1871 to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment. After the Civil War, recalcitrant southerners, acting
through groups like the Ku Klux Klan, intimidated the freedmen and their
white supporters, organized lynch mobs, burned houses, and, in general,
attempted to restore the old order. The statute authorizes a cause of action
against “[e]very person” who, acting “under color of” state law, violates
constitutional rights.2 Professor Shapo went on to recount the legislative
history of § 1983 and the relevant case law over the next nine decades.3
Interestingly, the Supreme Court rarely addressed § 1983 issues during
that ninety-year period.4 Few cases were brought under the statute,5 and
lower courts typically gave it a limited reach. When lower courts did
consider § 1983 claims, they mainly read “under color of” as a requirement
that the plaintiff show that state law authorized the violation, so that the
availability of a state remedy would thwart the plaintiff’s effort to obtain
access to federal court.6 Under this interpretation, the application of a statute
that denies the right to vote to African Americans would be a § 1983
violation, whereas police brutality that violates state law would not.
The centerpiece of Professor Shapo’s article was the Supreme Court’s
1961 ruling in Monroe v. Pape, in which the Court ruled that the lower
courts’ interpretation of § 1983 was incorrect.7 The Court explained that
“[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter
need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”8 In
1

Marshall S. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 NW. U. L.
REV. 277 (1965). I will refer to this article as Constitutional Tort for the remainder of this Essay.
2
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
3
See Shapo, supra note 1, at 279–319.
4
Wholly separate from § 1983, the Court developed a cause of action for prospective relief,
stemming from Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING,
DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 927, 927 n.1 (7th ed. 2015). But damages were (and are) not available in Ex parte
Young litigation.
5
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 986.
6
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 214, n.21 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
7
Id. at 168.
8
Id. at 183.
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other words, the Court held that a § 1983 cause of action was available
whether or not state law provided a remedy for the constitutional violation.
This reading considerably enhanced the statute’s utility as a tool for
enforcing constitutional rights, enabling courts to hold that official acts that
violate state law, and for which state law provides a remedy, were also
violations of the statute. Professor Shapo then described the case law that
emerged in the first few years after Monroe.9
In the decades after Constitutional Tort was published, the volume of
§ 1983 litigation in the lower courts grew exponentially, the Supreme Court
decided many more § 1983 cases, and § 1983 scholarship proliferated.10
Much of the later judicial and scholarly work builds on Professor Shapo’s
article, which warrants rereading even today. This brief Essay discusses three
reasons why: (1) Professor Shapo’s focus on doctrine rather than theory; (2)
his recognition of the important distinction between offensive and defensive
constitutional remedies; and (3) his emphasis on the “tort” aspect of § 1983
litigation.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL TORT LAW

In Monroe, the plaintiff claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights; the Court’s holding could have been limited to such cases. But,
instead, the Court’s holding is broadly stated, and it quickly became apparent
that the § 1983 cause of action would not be limited to Fourth Amendment
claims, as evidenced by Professor Shapo’s discussion in Constitutional
Torts. His survey of the lower court cases showed that “the post-Monroe
decisions have included at least a suggestion of a claim under each separate
clause of the Bill of Rights,” except for the clauses concerned with “judicial
mechanics.”11 He inferred, perhaps from the Court’s own language in
Monroe—explaining that the statute “should be read against the background
of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of
his actions”12—that “what is developing is a kind of ‘constitutional tort.’ It
is not quite a private tort, yet contains tort elements; it is not ‘constitutional
law,’ but employs a constitutional test.”13 Professor Shapo went on to
become a preeminent torts scholar, yet he never returned (in a sustained way)

9

Shapo, supra note 1, at 279–319.
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 4, at 987, 994–95.
11
Shapo, supra note 1, at 323.
12
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
13
Shapo, supra note 1, at 323–24.
10
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to the “interesting amalgam”14 of tort and constitutional elements he
identified in § 1983 litigation.15
Nonetheless, his description of the § 1983 damages cause of action was
prescient, for the Supreme Court has borrowed heavily from tort law in
adjudicating § 1983 issues. It has said that § 1983 “creates a species of tort
liability,”16 and it has identified the aims of constitutional tort as vindication
of rights and deterrence of violations,17 goals that track the common law of
torts.18 As for specific doctrines that mirror tort law, the Court has adopted a
common law but–for test for cause in fact,19 and has curbed recovery for lack
of proximate cause.20 Damages are measured by the common law
“compensation principle,”21 and the test for punitive damages tracks the
common law requirement of egregious misconduct.22 The qualified
immunity doctrine has common law roots as well.23
Some scholars deplore the Supreme Court’s “tort rhetoric.”24 In the
leading article denouncing the role of tort terminology, Professor Sheldon
Nahmod argues that “the Court, by using tort rhetoric, is attempting to
marginalize § 1983 and to make it less protective of fourteenth amendment
rights.”25 Professor Nahmod goes on to criticize, often with good reason,
several Supreme Court cases that limit the scope of § 1983.26 But Professor
Nahmod’s characterization of the Court’s references to tort as “rhetoric”
already hints that the driving force behind the limits was not any tort concept.

14

Id. at 324.
It is important to note, however, that Professor Shapo’s later work in general tort law influenced
scholarship on constitutional tort analogues. His book The Duty to Act helped to frame the constitutional
tort affirmative duty analysis in Professors Eaton and Wells’s article Governmental Inaction as a
Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and Its Aftermath. Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental
Inaction as a Constitutional Tort: DeShaney and Its Aftermath, 66 WASH. L. REV. 107, 108 n.6 (1991).
16
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976).
17
See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139 (1988); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988);
Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307–10 (1986); Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622, 650–51 (1980).
18
See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997).
19
See, e.g., Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 20–21 (1999) (per curiam); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
20
See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980); see also County of Los Angeles v. Mendez,
137 S. Ct. 1539, 1548–49 (2017) (remanding for consideration of proximate cause).
21
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255, 257 (1978); Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist., 477 U.S. at 306–07.
22
See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 48–49 (1983).
23
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
24
Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J.
1719, 1719–20 (1989).
25
Id. at 1720.
26
Id. at 1725–31, 1738–51.
15
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Instead, the Court may deploy tort rhetoric as window dressing for results on
other grounds. In particular, the modern Supreme Court has tended to favor
government over individual interests in § 1983 litigation, regardless of
whether it uses tort rhetoric in its opinions. For example, it has rejected the
tort concept of vicarious liability,27 and it has largely abandoned the tort law
roots of qualified immunity.28
The larger point is that, the Court’s rhetoric aside, tort concepts must,
and should, inform the resolution of § 1983 issues. This is the insight
reflected in Professor Shapo’s characterization of the area as an “amalgam”
of constitutional and tort principles. A § 1983 suit for damages raises issues
that closely resemble traditional common law tort issues.29 In both types of
litigation, the breach of duty occurred in the past. In both, the breach may or
may not be responsible for the plaintiff’s current harm, and some principle
must be devised to determine whether it is or is not. In both, the amount of
harm may be contested, and some principle must be devised to govern the
resolution of the dispute. Finally, in both, the defendant may have acted with
a greater or lesser degree of fault, and some principle must be chosen to
determine how much fault is enough to trigger liability.
The principles that govern the outcomes of ordinary tort cases should
not be automatically applied to constitutional tort. But they are a starting
point for an argument over whether and how to modify the principles to suit
the needs of the constitutional tort context. In this sense, it is appropriate to
decide § 1983 cases “against the background of tort liability.”30
In practice, however, the Court has borrowed tort principles to suit its
immediate purposes but has often neglected the distinctive issues that arise
in the application of common law tort principles to § 1983. For example, in
Carey v. Piphus31 and Memphis Community School District v. Stachura,32 the
Court adopted the common law “compensation principle” as the measure of
damages for constitutional torts. But the Court also recognized that common
law tort rules of damages may not “provide a complete solution to the
damages issue in every § 1983 case.”33 In this set of cases, “the interests
protected by a particular constitutional right may not also be protected by an
27

See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978).
Compare Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555 (borrowing the common law “good faith” defense), with
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982) (abandoning the “good faith” prong of qualified
immunity in favor of a strictly objective test).
29
See Michael Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 MISS. L.J.
157, 164–76 (1998).
30
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
31
435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978).
32
477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986).
33
Carey, 435 U.S. at 258.
28
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analogous branch of the common law of torts.”34 In that event, “the task will
be the more difficult one of adapting common-law rules of damages to
provide fair compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of a
constitutional right.”35 It is a dismaying fact that, in the four decades since
Carey, the Court has taken no steps to build on this insight. Its failure to do
so is hardly compatible with the notion that the Court has a strong interest in
the application of tort principles to constitutional tort law.36 Modern
constitutional tort law would be more coherent, and more effective at
vindicating rights and deterring violations, if the Court had paid more
attention to the “interesting amalgam” Professor Shapo identified fifty-five
years ago.
II. OFFENSIVE VERSUS DEFENSIVE REMEDIES
Once the Supreme Court read “under color of” broadly in Monroe, a
whole new set of issues arose regarding what remedy a plaintiff may obtain
upon proving a § 1983 violation. One of the lessons Professor Shapo draws
from the post-Monroe cases is that the § 1983 cause of action is available to
a broad range of constitutional violations that bear little resemblance to those
committed by the Ku Klux Klan in the post-Civil War period.37 This Part will
examine Professor Shapo’s categorization of offensive and defensive
remedies and how, while some may argue for a less limited approach to
damages, Professor Shapo was one of the first to identify remediation as an
essential part of rights. His idea was one that would require a delicate balance
between protecting rights and limiting the burden on the government.
A recurring theme in the second half of Constitutional Tort is Professor
Shapo’s recognition of the differences between offensive and defensive
remedies. A defensive remedy is a shield against criminal or civil liability.
For example, a bookseller charged with distributing obscene materials may
attempt to raise the First Amendment as a defense. When the right-claimant
becomes a plaintiff, he attempts to use the Constitution as a sword to obtain
damages or prospective relief. For example, the bookseller may attempt to
sue the police under § 1983 for damages for false arrest. Offensive remedies,
in particular the damages remedy authorized by Monroe, will not necessarily

34

Id.
Id.
36
For some suggestions as to how common law tort doctrine may be adapted to the constitutional
tort context, see Wells, supra note 29, at 196–222; Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law
Torts, and Due Process of Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 617, 618 (1997); and Eaton & Wells, supra note
15, at 159–65.
37
See Shapo, supra note 1, at 320–26.
35
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be available for every violation of a constitutional right.38 Commenting on
Colon v. Grieco, a case in which a New Jersey District Court declined to
allow the defendant to recover damages when he was detained for ten days
without a charge,39 Professor Shapo notes that “the most provocative issue
presented” in many post-Monroe cases relates to “the application of the
statute as a sword in the context of [constitutional] provisions which
principally have been interpreted as shields.”40 He pointed out “that a
significant difference lies between overturning a criminal conviction because
the defendant’s Bill of Rights guarantees have been violated (or overruling
a defendant officer’s justification in a trespass action) and the affirmative
grant of a civil action for damages.”41 And the criminal justice fact pattern
illustrated by Colon is not unique. Later in the article, Professor Shapo
returns to this point in discussing § 1983 litigation aimed at enforcing
Fourteenth Amendment rights in other contexts.42
Professor Shapo perceived a need for some restraint on liability in order
to avoid “the development of a variety of federal common law without a
correspondingly compelling federal interest.”43 Perhaps influenced by
Justice Frankfurter’s federalism-based Monroe dissent,44 Professor Shapo
recommended that “the federal judiciary should tread warily in utilizing a
civil damage remedy against local law enforcement officers, where much
that is vital to the case grows uniquely from the local situation.”45 He
suggested a rule that recovery be limited to cases in which the defendant’s
conduct was “outrageous.”46
Reading the article fifty-five years after it was published, one may
suggest that Professor Shapo was too quick to favor limits on the damages
remedy. He could not have foreseen the increasing importance of the
damages remedy as the Court expanded the scope of constitutional protection
in the late 1960s and 1970s. For example, Pickering v. Board of Education
held that government employees could not be dismissed for speech protected

38
Writing in 1965, Professor Shapo noted that few defenses had yet emerged. See id. at 324. The
main defense is qualified immunity, which the Supreme Court recognized in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967).
39
See Shapo, supra note 1, at 302 & n.127 (discussing Colon v. Grieco, 226 F. Supp. 414 (D.N.J.
1964)).
40
Id. at 303.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 322 (“Even given the broad language of the statute, it seems questionable that a breach of
this constitutional shield must in all cases call forth the response of this statutory sword.”).
43
Id. at 326–27.
44
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 237–42 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
45
Shapo, supra note 1, at 325.
46
Id. at 327.
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by the First Amendment.47 Estelle v. Gamble held that prisoners have an
Eighth Amendment right to some level of medical attention.48 In Board of
Regents v. Roth and its companion case, Perry v. Sindermann, the Court
recognized that government employees may have “property” or “liberty”
interests in their employment, and when they do, they cannot be dismissed
without due process.49 Much of current constitutional tort litigation concerns
efforts to enforce these guarantees. In all of these contexts, a damages
remedy may be the only effective means of vindicating constitutional rights
and deterring violations. Because the violation is in the past, it will not likely
be repeated, and it is not linked to any ongoing legal process against the
right-claimant.50
The more important point is that, in distinguishing “sword” from
“shield” remedies, Professor Shapo anticipated Professor Daryl Levinson’s
critique of “rights essentialism” by several decades. Rights essentialism is
the view that “rights can be talked about and understood—indeed, can be
best understood—in complete isolation from (merely) remedial concerns.”51
Following Professor Shapo’s lead, Professor Levinson goes on to reject the
understanding of rights in favor of “remedial equilibration,” which holds that
“[r]ights are dependent on remedies not just for their application to the real
world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence.”52 Finally, drawing on
Professor Levinson’s work, Professor Richard Fallon has articulated “the
Equilibration Thesis,” which “holds that courts, and especially the Supreme
Court, decide cases by seeking what they regard as an acceptable overall

47

391 U.S. 563, 574–75 (1968); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983) (holding that
a public employee who speaks on a matter of public concern may nonetheless be fired if the disruption
caused by the speech outweighs its value).
48
429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) (holding that
prisoners have an Eighth Amendment right to be protected from attacks by other prisoners).
49
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 577 (1972) (concluding that respondent had not shown
he had a liberty or property interest in re-employment but describing circumstances in which such
interests do exist); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599, 602 (1972) (finding that a teacher may have
“property” or “liberty” interests in the decision as to the renewal of a teaching contract and remanding
for a determination as to whether respondent had an “entitlement to job tenure” based on length of
employment as a public college professor).
50
See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). It is important
to distinguish between § 1983, on the one hand, and suits brought against federal officers under the federal
common law remedy recognized in Bivens. The Court has severely restricted access to the latter remedy,
most recently in Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 737 (2020) (denying a Bivens remedy for a crossborder shooting).
51
Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858
(1999) (emphasis in original) (applying qualified immunity to federal officers).
52
Id.
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alignment of doctrines involving justiciability, substantive rights, and
available remedies.”53
Professor Shapo also recognized that the link between rights and
remedies has a normative aspect, which is why he suggested a requirement
that “the defendant’s conduct be outrageous” in order for the plaintiff to
obtain damages for constitutional violations.54 Two years after Professor
Shapo’s article appeared, the Supreme Court adopted a different limit. In
Pierson v. Ray, the Supreme Court held that police officers sued for Fourth
Amendment violations for false arrest would have a defense based on “good
faith and probable cause.”55 This case was the starting point for a “qualified
immunity” doctrine, based partly on fairness to defendants and partly to limit
the burden on government for damages litigation.56 Later cases applied this
rule, or a version of it, to other officers, including a state governor,57 a cabinet
officer,58 and school board members.59 Finally, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the
Court stated an across-the-board qualified immunity doctrine.60 Citing the
“social costs” of constitutional tort litigation, Harlow held that
“[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.”61 Professor Fallon defends Harlow62 on the
ground that “official immunity doctrines perform an equilibrating function
by diminishing the social costs that constitutional rights would have if
officers who violated them were always strictly liable in suits for damages.”63
Professors Shapo, Levinson, and Fallon are on solid ground in
recognizing the need for remedial equilibration. But one must distinguish
between the question of whether such an equilibrating doctrine is appropriate
and the question of what its content should be. In practice, the Court’s
53
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their Connections
to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 637 (2006).
54
Shapo, supra note 1, at 327 (emphasis omitted).
55
386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
56
See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–14
(1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319–20 (1975).
57
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974).
58
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
59
Wood, 420 U.S. at 318.
60
457 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring). This point was made explicitly by Justice Brennan. Id.;
see, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933, 955–
56 (2019).
61
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
62
See Fallon, supra note 60, at 975.
63
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
479, 485 (2011).
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application of the “clearly established law” test has led it to rule that qualified
immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.”64 As such, while other analysts may favor even less
protection for government officers65 than Professor Shapo’s proposal, his
“abuse of power” proposal is more defendant-protective than the Court’s
current test, where even a malicious official may escape liability “unless the
right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the
defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.”66
Most significantly, at the dawn of constitutional tort Professor Shapo
recognized the distinction between offensive and defensive remedies and
laid the foundation for the understanding that rights are defined in part by
their remedies. He understood the normative connection between rights and
remedies and foresaw that the advent of a sword-like damages remedy would
require some attention to the costs and the benefits of such broad remedies.
III. THE CASE FOR DOCTRINAL SCHOLARSHIP
While legal scholarship has trended toward the interdisciplinary,
Constitutional Tort is an example of a purely doctrinal work whose
contributions have stood the test of time. In this Part, I examine the shift from
doctrinal to interdisciplinary scholarship and explain why Professor Shapo’s
doctrinal scholarship defies the trend and serves as an indispensable resource
to scholars and practitioners.
Constitutional Tort focuses on the statute, its legislative history, and
case law; it contains a bit of history, but no economics, no philosophy, no
psychology, nor any other discipline external to law. It is a fine example of
doctrinal scholarship, a style that used to dominate the law reviews, and is
an enduring illustration of the value of the traditional approach. Doctrinal
scholarship focuses on the content and application of cases, statutes, and
administrative regulations. It draws on the text, background, and purposes of
cases and enactments, traces their evolution over time, and examines the
soundness of the strictly legal reasoning courts use to justify their rulings.
Professor Shapo wrote Constitutional Tort before “the decline of law as an
autonomous discipline,”67 a shift which, among other things, brought with it
the rise of the field of interdisciplinary scholarship that now prevails. Judge
64

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 209
(2013) (favoring a negligence approach); Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity,
93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1800 (2018) (favoring abolition of qualified immunity).
66
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (citation omitted).
67
Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:1962–1987, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 761, 761 (1987).
65
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Posner, an avatar of the new approach, contrasts the early 1960s, when “the
lawyer’s traditional faith in the autonomy of his discipline seemed well
founded,”68 with developments in the quarter-century that followed. For a
variety of reasons,69 by the mid-1980s the conception of law as an
autonomous discipline had been “dethroned.”70 In the thirty-odd years since
Judge Posner’s essay, the trend he discerned has only grown more
pronounced.71 Judge Posner appreciated, as we all do, the contributions other
disciplines make to understanding and making law.
Today no one advocates a return to the old days. For the reasons Judge
Posner identified, there is a compelling case for bringing other perspectives
to bear on legal problems.72 Though some proponents of the newer
approaches would banish doctrinal scholarship or consign it to an inferior
status,73 it does not follow that doctrinal scholarship lacks value. Every
scholar, whatever the methodology, starts with a perspective from which to
examine reality. The author necessarily excludes other angles from which
the topic at hand may be studied in order to isolate the feature—economic,
philosophical, historical, or otherwise74—that she wants to explore. The
value of any scholarly work depends on whether the author’s project yields
interesting insights otherwise inaccessible to the reader. Lessons from
economics, philosophy, and history, among other disciplines, can provide
valuable insights into law and legal institutions. But the benefits always
come at a cost. Any framework is, after all, a frame, and necessarily
sacrifices the insights available from looking at the topic from other angles.
All of the external perspectives on law have in common the rejection of law

68

Id. at 764.
See id. at 766–77. Judge Posner discusses, among other things, “shattering of the political
consensus,” “a boom in disciplines that are complementary to law, particularly economics and
philosophy,” a collapse in “confidence in the ability of lawyers on their own to put right the major
problems of the legal system,” a desire on the part of leading scholars “to be innovators rather than
imitators,” “the continuing rise in the prestige and authority of scientific and other exact modes of
inquiry,” and “the increasing importance of statutes and of the Constitution, compared to common law,
as sources of law.” Id. at 767, 769, 772–73.
70
Id. at 761.
71
Lynn M. LoPucki, Dawn of the Discipline-Based Law Faculty, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 506, 506–07
(2016) (documenting the growth of Ph.D.s on law faculties); James G. Milles, Leaky Boundaries and the
Decline of the Autonomous Law School Library, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 387, 387 (2004).
72
See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1101,
1101 (2020). In this and other recent articles, Professor Schwartz relies on a massive empirical study to
suggest radical reform of constitutional tort law.
73
See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34–35 (1992); David E. Van Zandt, The Relevance of Social Theory to
Legal Theory, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 10, 24–25 (1989).
74
For convenience, I will refer to economists, historians, and philosophers as a shorthand for the
whole array of interdisciplinary approaches to law.
69

266

115:256 (2020)

Constitutional Tort Fifty-Five Years Later

as an autonomous discipline.75 Thus, all of them sacrifice the insights that
come from the internal perspective. The internal perspective is the
framework of doctrinal scholarship. It, too, creates a frame. Its shortcoming
is that it cannot generate the knowledge that comes from any of the external
approaches, but its strength is that it produces knowledge that none of the
external approaches, even taken together, can generate. And the knowledge
it produces is probably of more use to lawyers, judges, and students than
most of what they will learn from other disciplines.
A systematic problem with the perspective of the economist, the
historian, the philosopher, and so on, is a tendency to exalt that perspective
over all others. This tendency reflects a psychological phenomenon called
“the law of the instrument,”76 which holds, in colloquial terms, that “if the
only tool you have is a hammer . . . treat everything as if it were a nail.”77 A
historian interested in law probably will not regard this as a problem when
he studies or reads legal history because he cares only about the truths the
historian can provide. The same is true of the economist or the philosopher.
But the consumers of legal scholarship include lawyers, students, and judges.
They may benefit from economic, historical, and philosophical analysis, but
they will rarely be fully satisfied with it. In order to understand a judicial
opinion, they need to know more than the historical context in which it arose,
or the philosophical premises underlying it, or the economic implications of
alternative approaches. They need to know more or less precisely what the
earlier cases held and how the court reasoned from those holdings to the
outcome here, or how the court distinguished the earlier cases. In order to
evaluate the holding, they need to know the strong points and the weak points
in the court’s reasoning, and they need some guidance as to whether there is
room to argue the strength or weakness of any given point. Sometimes, the
economist, the historian, or the philosopher can (and will choose to) help
with this project. More often, it will be the doctrinal scholar, with his or her
training in the “artificial reason” of the law,78 who provides guidance. Seen
in this way, the distinctive contribution of traditional legal scholarship is that
it does not bring some other discipline to bear on legal problems.
Following the doctrinal model, Professor Shapo tells the lawyer, the
judge, the law student, and even the interdisciplinary scholar, most of what
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See generally Van Zandt, supra note 73 (discussing the ways in which legal theory may be
considered a subset of social theory).
76
See ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY: METHODOLOGY FOR BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE
28 (1964).
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See ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE: A RECONNAISSANCE 15–16 (1966).
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The term is borrowed from Sir Edward Coke. See Prohibitions Del Roy, 6 Coke Rep. 280, 282
(1608), quoted in Posner, supra note 67, at 762 n.1.
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he or she needs to know about Monroe, its antecedents, and its early progeny.
Anyone interested in learning about constitutional tort (including scholars
from other disciplines) will benefit from spending some time with the paper.
Bringing no external frame to the development of constitutional tort law,
Professor Shapo uses the analytical and synthetic tools of a lawyer to
examine the background of § 1983, its drafting, its use by courts over time,
its revival in Monroe, and its post-Monroe development. For example,
Professor Shapo’s discussion of statutory interpretation reflects the
conventions of the time.79 It is not as theory-laden as the approaches
developed in later decades by Professor William Eskridge,80 or Professors
William Baude and Stephen Sachs.81 Precisely because he does not shape the
evidence to fit a theory, Professor Shapo’s treatment of statutory
interpretation complements other approaches.
Professor Shapo’s research into the ninety-year history of the statute
before Monroe is similarly helpful. His analysis of the cases decided during
this period clarifies the issues and holdings,82 providing the background
needed for anyone seeking to better understand the topic, rather than forcing
the case law into a theoretical frame that may obscure as much as it would
reveal. The latter half of the paper turns to the years after Monroe. In this
section, Professor Shapo surveys and categorizes the “crazy quilt” of postMonroe lower court case law.83 His doctrinal approach makes the variety of
lower court rulings available to any reader.84 His strictly legal analysis of the
diverse approaches in the case law is accessible to lawyers, students, and
judges wrestling with narrow legal issues from an internal perspective and
79
Professor Shapo does not cite any sources for his approach to statutory interpretation, Shapo, supra
note 1, at 279–82, probably because it was the consensus view that statutes should be interpreted
according to their purposes. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 148 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994); see also Posner, supra note 67, at 774–77 (discussing the pitfalls of certain modes of statutory
interpretation).
80
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1483
(1987) (arguing that interpretation of a statute should take into account changes in society and unforeseen
circumstances).
81
See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1082
(2017) (arguing that statutory “interpretation . . . [is] governed by law”).
82
The line of Supreme Court cases between the enactment of § 1983 and Monroe includes Myers v.
Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268
(1939); Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Professor Shapo describes this line of authority with
economy and precision. See Shapo, supra note 1, at 282–87. This discussion is followed by an equally
helpful examination of an array of lower court cases decided in the fifteen years before Monroe. See id.
at 287–94.
83
See id. at 297.
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to scholars from other disciplines armed with theories and looking for realworld targets to which the theories may be applied. By contrast, a theorist
would have selected one or two of these later cases to make a point about
history, philosophy, economics, or some other external discipline.
The value of a piece of scholarship depends on what it delivers, not on
the methodology it employs. There is much to learn from doctrinal
scholarship in general, and from Professor Shapo’s fifty-five-year-old article
in particular. Even Judge Posner recognized that “[d]isinterested legaldoctrinal analysis of the traditional kind remains the indispensable core of
legal thought,” and lamented that “there is no surfeit of such analysis
today.”85 Professor Shapo’s article is a perfect example of what Judge Posner
was looking for, analysis that represents “the indispensable core of legal
thought.”86
CONCLUSION
After writing Constitutional Tort, Professor Shapo moved on to other
topics in tort law. Other parts of this festschrift are devoted to his work on
products liability and many other areas. His insights on those topics are many
and varied, and torts scholars have benefited from them greatly. I cannot help
but to regret his decision to leave § 1983 to others, but Professor Shapo’s
seminal article laid out the issues that would occupy constitutional tort
scholars for over half a century. His work inspired me, as well as many
others, to take an interest in the area. Throughout my career, I have benefitted
greatly from his article, and from all of his books and articles over the whole
range of tort law. I thank the Northwestern University Law Review for giving
me the opportunity to comment on the enduring influence of Constitutional
Tort.
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